Appendix To: Why The Revelation of the Identity Of Deep Throat Has Only Created Another Mystery

By JOHN W. DEAN
Friday, June 3, 2005

According To All The President’s Men The Following Information Was Provided
By Deep Throat — Deputy FBI Director Mark Felt — To Washington Post
Reporter Bob Woodward


Prepared By
John W. Dean

Note: The statements in red are those I believe may well be false based on my review of historical information in the records of the Senate Watergate Committee, and in the files of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office, not to mention my knowledge of the events. The page numbers in parentheses refer to the hardbound edition of All The President’s Men. —John Dean
June 19, 1972   "the break-in case was going to 'heat up.'" (Page 23)
June 19, 1972   Howard Hunt was "a prime suspect in the Watergate investigation for many reasons." (25). Later, the authors characterize Hunt as "definitely involved in Watergate." (72)
Undated/Summer 1972

Throat told Woodward that the FBI badly wanted to know where the Post was getting its information. He thought Woodward and Bernstein might be followed, and he cautioned them to take care when using their telephone. (72)

The White House … regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived. (72)

Even the FBI did not understand what was happening. (72)

Throat made … veiled references to the CIA and national security which Woodward did not understand. (72)

September 16, 1972

Throat said Woodward's story was " too soft" when it reported reported "that federal investigators had received information from the Nixon campaign workers that high officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President had been involved in the funding of the Watergate operation." (73)

John Mitchell's top assistants were only 'among those' who controlled the fund. (73)

Throat … would not say if the former Attorney General [John Mitchell] had prior knowledge of the bugging attempt. (73)

September 17, 1972

"Both the FBI and the White House were determined to learn how the Post was getting its information and to put a stop to it." (76)

"The situation was far more dangerous than Woodward realized." (76)

"The story about Mitchell's aides had infuriated the White House." (76)

"They're both [Magruder and Porter] deeply involved in Watergate." "The whole thing." (76)

Throat confirmed that Magruder and Porter had received at least $50,000 from Stans' safe. And Woodward could be damned sure that money had not been used for legitimate purposes -- that was fact, not allegation.

Undated

Deep Throat had said that Sloan had had no prior knowledge of the bugging, or how the money was to be spent. (78)

Deep Throat had been explicit in saying the withdrawals financed the Watergate bugging. (78)

Undated Deep Throat had talked about how politics had infiltrated every corner of government -- a strong-arm takeover of the agencies by the Nixon White House. Junior White House aides were giving orders on the highest levels of the bureaucracy. He once called it the "switchblade mentality." (134-35)
October 8, 1972

"I can't and won't give you any new names, but everything points in the direction of what was called 'Offensive Security.'" (134-35)

"Remember, you don't do those 1500 [FBI] interviews [which had been publicly announced] and not have something on your hands other than a single break-in." (134-35)

"Much of the intelligence-gathering was on their own campaign contributors, and some to check on the Democratic contributors -- to check people out and sort of semi-blackmail them if something was found … a very heavy-handed operation." (134-35)

"Mitchell was involved [in the break-in.]" (134-35)

The extent of Mitchell's involvement was known only to "Mitchell and the President." (134-35)

"Mitchell conducted his own -- he called it an investigation -- for about ten days after June 17. And he was going crazy. He found all sorts of new things which astounded even him." (134-35)

"At some point, Howard Hunt, of all the ironies, was assigned to help Mitchell get some information. Like lightning, he was pulled off and fired and told to pack up his desk and leave town forever. By no less than John Ehrlichman." (134-35)

"Check every lead. It goes all over the map, and that is important. You could write stories from now until Christmas or well beyond that… Not one of the games [his term for undercover operations] was free-lance. This is important. Everyone was tied in." (134-35)

Mitchell "definitely learned some things in those ten days after Watergate, He was just sick, and everyone was saying that he was ruined because of what his people did, especially Mardian and LaRue, and what happened at the White House. And Mitchell said, 'If this all comes out, it could ruin the administration. I mean, ruin it.' Mitchell realized he was personally ruined and would have to get out." (134-35)

"The Howard Hunt group reported to Chuck Colson, who maybe didn't know specifically about the bugging. There is no proof, but Colson was getting daily updates on the activities and the information." (134-35)

"I know of intelligence-gathering and games in Illinois, New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, California, Texas, Florida and the District of Columbia." (134-35)

The President's forces had been out to wreck the campaigns both of Democrats and of Nixon's challengers within his own party -- Representative Paul McCloskey of California and Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio. (134-35)

Regarding Howard Hunt and leak-plugging at the White House, Throat said, "That operation was not only to check leaks to the papers but often to manufacture items for the press. It was a Colson-Hunt operation. Recipients include all of you guys -- Jack Anderson, Evans and Novak, the Post and the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune." (134-35)

"The business of Eagleton's drunk-driving record or his health records, I understand, involves the White House and Hunt somehow." (134-35)

"Total manipulation -- that was their goal, with everyone eating at one time or another out of their hands. Even the press." (134-35)

Throat confirmed that the grand jury's investigations had been "limited to the Watergate operation -- and had ignored other espionage and sabotage. If it wasn't limited to Watergate proper, they would never have finished, believe me." (134-35)

"There is also non-corroborative testimony before the grand jury, driving everyone wild, certain perjury." [by Sally Harmony and others.] (134-35)

"They want to single out the Post. They want to go to court to get at your sources." (134-35)

In response to a question about the Canuck Letter, Throat said, "It was a White House operation -- done inside the gates surround the White House and the Executive Office Building." (134-35)

"You can safely say that fifty people worked for the White House and CRP to play games and spy and sabotage and gather intelligence. Some of it is beyond belief, kicking at the opposition in every imaginable way. You already know some of it." (134-35)

Throat told Woodward that there was information in the files of "Justice and the Bureau" about bugging, following people, false press leaks, fake letters, canceling campaign rallies, investigations ofcampaign workers' private lives, planting spies, stealing documents, planting provocateurs in political demonstrations. (134-35)

October 21, 1972

"I won't be a source on a Haldeman story." (172-73)

Regarding a Segretti story, Throat said, "Chapin took it close in and there's a lot of tension. That's to put it mildly -- there's tension about Haldeman. Be careful." (172-73)

Undated Throat had confirmed that Haldeman was a controller of the funds held by Sloan. (184)
October 26-27, 1972

Throat chides Woodward for letting "Haldeman slip away" on the fund control story. Throat tells Woodward, "Let me explain something. When you move on somebody like Haldeman, you've got to be sure you're on the most solid ground. Shit, what a royal screw-up." (195)

Throat says, "From top to bottom, this whole business is a Haldeman operation. He ran the money. Insulated himself through those functionaries around him." (196)

Throat described the Haldeman operation. "This guy is bright and can be smooth when necessary . . . but most of the time he is not smooth. He is Assistant President and everyone has access to him if they want to take it. He sends out orders; he can be very nasty about it." (196)

Throat described Haldeman's four assistants: Higby -- "a young-punk nobody who does what he is told"; Chapin -- "smarter and more urbane than Higby, also a dedicated yes-man"; Strachan -- "soldierly and capable"; and Butterfield -- "an ex-Air Force colonel who knows how to push paper and people." (196)

Throat explains how lawyers build a conspiracy investigation from the outer edges inward. (196)

January 24, 1973

Throat does his Ziegler imitation. (244)

Throat says, "Colson and Mitchell were behind the Watergate operation. Everyone in the FBI is convinced, including Gray. Colson's role was active. Mitchell's position was more 'amoral' and less active -- giving the nod but not conceiving the scheme. . . . 'Insulation' is the key world to understand why the evidence can't be developed." (244)

Four factors lead to the “inescapable conclusion” that Mitchell and Colson were conspirators. “One, the personalities, and past performance of both. This way of life wasn’t new to them. Two, there are meetings and phone calls at crucial times. Three, there’s the tight control of money, especially by Mitchell, who was getting details almost to the point of how much was spent on pencils and erasers. Four, there is the indisputable fact that the seven defendants believe they are going to be taken care of. That could only be done convincingly by someone high up, and somehow it has been done convincingly." (244-45)

Throat said that there was no disagreement anywhere in the belief that Colson and Mitchell were involved. “The White House knows it, the FBI brass knows it.“ (245)

“What obviously makes this a Mitchell-Colson operation is the hiring of Liddy and Hunt. That’s the key. Mitchell and Colson were their sponsors. And if you check you’ll find that Liddy and Hunt had reputations that are the lowest. The absolute lowest. Hiring these two was immoral. They got exactly what they wanted. Liddy wanted to tap the New York Times and everybody knew it. And not everybody was laughing about it. Mitchell, among others, liked the idea." (245)

“Liddy and McCord should realize that noone can help them because it will be too obvious. Any congressional investigation is going to have a big problem unless they get someone from the inside to crack. Without that, you come up with lots of money and plans for dirty tricks but no firsthand account or detailing of what happened at the top.” (245)

Throat said the White House was making plans so that no congressional investigation could succeed. Part of the plan was a broad use of executive privilege. (245)

In response to a question about manipulation of the original Watergate investigation, Throat said, “The attempt to separate the Watergate and the espionage-sabotage operation are a lot of bullshit. They amounted to the same thing. If the other stuff like [Segretti] had been pursued, they would have found plenty that was illegal.” (245)

Late February/
Early March, 1973

Throat tells Woodward he is not worried. “It can’t work. They’ll never get anyone. They never have. They’re hiding things that will come out and even discredit their war against leaks. The flood is coming, I’m telling you. So the White House wants to eat the Washington Post, so what? It will be wearing on you, but the end is in sight. It’s building and they see it and they know that they can’t stop the real story from coming out. That’s why they’re so desperate. Just be careful, yourselves and the paper, and wait them out, don’t jump too fast. Be careful and don’t be too anxious.” (269)

Responding to Woodward’s comment that Gray’s nomination made no sense, Throat said it made all the sense in the world although it was a big risk. “In early February, Gray went to the White House and said, in effect, ‘I’m taking the rap on Watergate.’ He got very angry and said he had done his job and contained the investigation judiciously, that it wasn’t fair that he was being was being singled out to take the heat. He implied that all hell could break loose if he wasn’t able to stay in the job permanently and keep the lid on. Nixon could have thought this was a threat, though Gray is not that sort of guy. Whatever the reason, the President agreed in a hurry and sent Gray’s name up to the Senate right away. Some of the top people in the White House were dead set against it, but they couldn’t talk him out of it.” (270) Note: This is one of the rare instances where Woodward partially corrects an erroneous statement by Throat, regarding Gray going to the White House, based on information from Gray’s attorney.

Woodward asked Throat if Gray was aware of the taps on reporters and White House aides. Throat said, “affirmative” although even he did not know all there was to know on the subject. “There was an out-of-channels vigilante squad of wiretappers that did it. Including taps on Hedrick Smith and Neil Sheehan of the New York Times, after the Pentagon Papers publication. But it started before that. All the records have supposedly been destroyed.” He explained that the wiretapping had been done by ex-FBI and ex-CIA agents who were hired outside of normal channels. Mardian had run the Justice Department end of the operation for the White House. Watergate was nothing new to the administration. (270)

Throat said, “There had been an election strategy session at which Haldeman pushed Mitchell to set up a wiretapping operation for the campaign. Mitchell had been reluctant, but Haldeman was insistent. Mitchell was instructed by the White House chief of staff to move part of the vigilante operation from the White House to the campaign. That meant Hunt and Liddy." (270)

Throat said, “In 1969, the first targets of aggressive wiretapping were the reporters and those in the administration who were suspected of disloyalty. Then the emphasis was shifted to radical political opposition during the anti-war protests. When it got near election time, it was only natural to tap the Democrats. The arrests in the Watergate sent everybody off the edge because the break-in could uncover the whole program.” (271)

April 16, 1973 During a telephone conversation, Throat said, “You’d better hang on for this. Dean and Haldeman are out – for sure. They’ll resign. There’s no way the President can avoid it.” The Post could publish it. “Someone’s talking. Several are talking – go find out.” (288)
April 26, 1973 Throat calls Woodward at Post. “You’ve heard the Gray story? Well it’s true. One June 28, in a meeting with Ehrlichman and Dean, Gray was told the files were – quote – ‘political dynamite’ and should – quote – ‘never see the light of day.’ He was told, quote, ‘they could do more damage than the Watergate bugging itself.” In fact, Ehrlichman had told Dean earlier in the day, “You go across the river every day, John. Why don’t you drop the goddamn fucking things in the river?’ Gray kept the files for about a week and then he says he threw them in a burn bag in his office. He says that he was not exactly told to destroy the files, but understood it was absolutely clear what Dean and Ehrlichman wanted.” (306) Note: Woodward, based on Gray’s Senate testimony before the Watergate Committee, corrects the burn bag statement.
May 16, 1973

[Throat has been transformed, and talks almost in a monologue, and when finished, departed; Woodward wrote it all down in a note book, which he later typed out for Bernstein.] “Everyone’s life is in danger. Deep Throat says that electronic survellance is going on and we had better watch it. The CIA is doing it.” (317)

Dean talked with Senator Baker after [the] Watergate committee formed and Baker is in the bag completely, reporting back directly to [the] White House. (318)

President threatened Dean personally and said if he ever revealed the national security activities the President would insure he went to jail. (318)

"Mitchell started doing covert national security and international things early and then involved everyone else. The list is longer than anyone could imagine.” (318)

Caulfield threatened McCord and said "your life is no good in this country if you don’t cooperate..." (318)

The covert activities involve the whole U.S. intelligence community and are incredible. Deep Throat refused to give specifics because it is against the law. (318)

The cover-up had little to do with the Watergate, but was mainly to protect the covert operations. (318)

The President himself had been blackmailed. When Hunt became involved, he decided that the conspirators could get some money for this. Hunt started an “extortion” racket of the rankest kind. (318)

"Cover-up cost to be about $1 million. Everyone involved – Haldeman, Ehrlichman, the President, Dean, Mardian, Caulfield and Mitchell. They all had a problem getting the money and couldn’t trust anyone, so they started raising money on the outside and chipping in their own personal funds. Mitchell couldn’t meet his quota and . . . they cut Mitchell loose.” (318)

CIA people can testify that Haldeman and Ehrlichman said that the President orders you to carry this out, meaning the Watergate cover up . . . Walters and Helms and maybe others. (318)

Apparently, though this is not clear, these guys in the White House were out to make money and a few of them went wild trying. (318)

Dean acted as go-between between Haldeman-Ehrlichman and Mitchell-LaRue. (319)

The documents that Dean has are much more than anyone has imagined and they are quite detailed. (319)

Hunt was key to much of the crazy stuff and he used the Watergate arrests to get money . . . first $100,000 and then kept going back for more. . . . (319)

Unreal atmosphere around the White House – realizing it is curtains on the one hand and on the other trying to laugh it off and go on with business. President has fits of “dangerous” depression. (319)

First week/
November, 1973
Throat’s message was short and simple: one or more of the tapes contained deliberate erasures. W/B story quoted Throat anonymously: gaps were of “a suspicious nature” which “could lead someone to conclude that the tapes have been tampered with.” (333)

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John W. Dean, a FindLaw columnist, is a former counsel to the president.

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